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ABSTRACT: For the past 10 years, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) has operated as an independent overseer of public company audits. Over 70 percent of
PCAOB studies have been published since 2010, evidencing the increasing relevance of
PCAOB-related research in recent years. Our paper reviews the existing literature on the
PCAOB’s four primary functions – Registration, Standard-Setting, Inspections, and
Enforcement. In particular, we examine PCAOB registration trends and evaluate the effects of
PCAOB registration requirements on the issuer audit market, as well as discuss the relative costs
and benefits (e.g., auditor behavior changes, improvements in audit quality, auditor perceptions)
of the 16 auditing standards the PCAOB passed in its first 10 years of operation. Further, we
summarize the literature’s findings on the effects of the PCAOB inspection process on various
facets of audit quality. Finally, we analyze the research concerning the PCAOB’s enforcement
actions to determine how markets have responded to sanctions against auditors and audit firms.
We contend that understanding and reviewing the effects of the PCAOB’s activities are
important to future audit research because of the PCAOB’s authority over and oversight of the
issuer audit profession. We also identify PCAOB-related research areas that have not been fully
explored and propose several research questions intended to address these research areas.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
On January 6, 2003, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) opened
its Washington, D.C. office; three days later, the PCAOB held its first open board meeting,
ending more than 100 years of self-regulation at the federal level by the public company audit
profession [PCAOB 2013c; Ernst & Young 2012]. The PCAOB had been established six months
earlier with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to protect the interests of investors and
further the public confidence in the preparation of informative, accurate and independent audit
reports [U.S. House of Representatives 2002]. Researchers, regulators, and practitioners have
tried to understand the influence of the PCAOB for over a decade. For example, what impact has
the PCAOB inspection process had on the auditing profession and audit quality? How have
markets reacted to information disseminated by the PCAOB? How have PCAOB standards
influenced auditor behavior? Accordingly, the objective of our paper is to review prior studies
related to the four primary functions of the PCAOB (i.e., registration, standard-setting,
inspections, and enforcement), synthesize the extant findings, and suggest directions for future
research to address unanswered questions.
Over 70 percent of PCAOB studies have been published since 2010, evidencing the
increasing relevance of PCAOB-related research in recent years. It is likely that in coming years,
PCAOB research will continue to grow and broaden as data on each of the functions of the
PCAOB become more available. The possibility exists that, as we learn more about the influence
of the PCAOB, many prior conceptions in academic research about the role of auditors, auditors’
obligations to their clients, and auditors’ responses to external scrutiny may warrant
reinvestigation or further exploration. While the breadth of the PCAOB research is fairly diverse,
1

we did identify some common themes. First, the research has concluded that PCAOB regulation
drove many small audit firms out of the issuer audit market [DeFond and Lennox 2011; Read et
al. 2004].1 However, this does not necessarily imply that auditor exits from the issuer audit
market were detrimental, as the auditors that remained appeared to be more independent, of
higher quality, and less likely to be the target of PCAOB enforcement actions than the exiting
auditors [DeFond and Lennox 2011].
Second, several papers have highlighted the costs and benefits of the PCAOB standardsetting activities (e.g., Smith [2012]; Wang and Zhou [2012]). For example, while some research
supports AS3’s increased focus on documentation (e.g., Payne and Ramsay [2008]), other
research (e.g., Piercey [2011]) highlight unintended, adverse effects on auditor judgments (e.g.,
more lenient judgments).
Third, while some research questions the efficacy of the inspection process (e.g., Lennox
and Pittman [2010], Glover et al. [2009]), several studies have contributed empirical evidence to
support the position that the PCAOB inspection process has been beneficial to the auditing
profession (e.g., Offermanns and Peek [2011], DeFond [2010]). Specifically, the extant literature
contends the market penalizes audit firms for receiving inspection reports containing PCAOBidentified deficiencies [Daugherty et al. 2011] and, over time, the inspection process has
appeared to lead to improved audit quality (e.g., Gramling et al. [2011], Landis et al. [2011]).
Fourth, enforcement actions and subsequent penalties borne by auditors that remained in
the issuer audit market appeared to be relatively more severe for smaller audit firms [Gilbertson
and Herron 2009]. However, enforcement actions levied against firms of all sizes resulted in
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The PCAOB defines a small audit firm as an audit firm that regularly audits 100 or fewer issuers each year; these
firms are inspected triennially.
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negative repercussions to both auditors (e.g., auditor retention) and to audit clients [Dee et al.
2011].
Understanding and reviewing the effects of the PCAOB is important to future research
because of the PCAOB’s authority over the audit profession. The effects of the PCAOB’s
decisions can have far-reaching implications on how audits are conducted, the pricing of audits,
the auditor/client relationship, the consequences of audit failure, and the public’s confidence in
the auditing profession. As the PCAOB’s activities have increased in recent years (e.g., increased
standard-setting docket, expanded inspection programs into dealer-broker audits), it is likely that
the PCAOB will continue to affect the auditing profession in the coming years. Our review
provides a foundation for future research by synthesizing and categorizing this emerging body of
research, as well as discussing future research opportunities. We structure our review around a
framework that is based on the four primary functions of the PCAOB (see Figure 1). That is, we
categorize each paper into one or more of the following functional categories – registration,
standard-setting, inspection, or enforcement. We examined PCAOB-related literature from the
past 10 years by searching ABI Inform and Business Source Premier for academic papers
containing the following keywords: PCAOB, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
auditing standard, inspection, and enforcement. Additionally, we consulted the reference section
of each paper reviewed to detect studies not identified during the initial search. While we
focused on research that has been published in accounting research journals for the purpose of
our review, we also reviewed a number of papers currently in progress and pending review.2
[Please insert Figure 1 here]

While our paper’s aim is to synthesize PCAOB-related research over the past decade, it is worth noting that
reviews by Schneider et al. [2009] and Asare et al. [2013] both provide reviews of the ICFR literature. While we
summarize the findings of these two reviews, our review will focus on studies not covered in either of the two
previous reviews.
2
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2.0 REGISTRATION
SOX [U.S. House of Representatives 2002], Section 102, states it shall be “unlawful for
any person that is not a registered public accounting firm to prepare or issue, or to participate in
the preparation or issuance of, any audit report with respect to any issuer.” Registration subjects
each firm to the oversight activities assigned to the PCAOB for the protection of investors
[PCAOB 2012a]. The registration process allows the PCAOB to recognize a firm as meeting the
minimum requirements to audit public issuers (though the registration process does not bear with
it any assurance of audit quality), as well as requires periodic reporting from registered firms
[PCAOB 2010a]. The periodic reporting requirements (1) keep the PCAOB informed of basic
demographic changes in the firm and its members, (2) reflect the extent and nature of the firm’s
audit practice related to issuers, and (3) inform the PCAOB of any circumstances that merit
follow-up through the PCAOB’s inspection process [PCAOB 2012a].
Registration and reporting with the PCAOB is a relatively simple process that requires
firms to complete two forms.3 The PCAOB provides detailed instructions to prospective audit
firms on how to prepare Form 1: Application for Registration [PCAOB 2010a]. Applicant firms
pay a one-time registration fee based on the number of issuer audit clients they engaged in the
preceding year. Following registration approval, registered firms are required to submit Form 2:
Annual Report on a yearly basis; detailing the activities and services provided by the firm to its
issuer clients. Similar to the registration fee, firms pay an annual reporting fee based on the
number of issuer clients from the preceding year [PCAOB 2011b].

3

There are technically five forms, however, three of the forms are required by the PCAOB only in special cases.
Form 3 – Special Report is generally required when a firm audits an issuer client that has had prior compliance
issues or has been engaged in ongoing legal proceedings. Form 4 – Succeeding to Registration Status of Predecessor
is used in rare situations where a registered firm merges with or is acquired by a non-registered firm. Finally Form
1-WD: Request to Withdraw from Registration is required only when a firm wishes to deregister from the PCAOB.
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Figure 2 provides the number of audit firms registered with the PCAOB from 20042012.4 The first bar in each year is the number of US registrants; the second bar is the number of
Non-US registrants; and the third bar is the total number of registrants. Of note is that the
number of registered firms appears to significantly increase in 2009.
[Please insert Figure 2 here]
2.1 Registration Literature
Despite the significance of the registration process, there is a paucity of academic
literature regarding registration with the PCAOB. To date, we found only two academic papers
on the subject of registration. Further, those two papers focus only on the causes of firm
deregistration (presented in Table 1 below). Specifically, Read et al. [2004] investigated the
effects SEC rule changes and PCAOB oversight following the passage of SOX; and provided
empirical evidence about audit firms whose clients are limited to the immediate local area or
region and changes in the market for SEC audits. They examined all Form 8-Ks associated with
auditor resignations from 2000-2003. In 2002-2003, they identified 47 local and regional audit
firms that were ceasing all SEC audits; while they identified only eight such firms in 2000-2001.
Interviews with audit partners of local and regional firms provided evidence that the primary
reasons for ceasing SEC audits were the perception of a more stringent oversight by the then
recently created PCAOB, increased professional liability insurance costs, and increased scrutiny
by the SEC.
Read et al. [2004] also found that many local and regional audit firms with no SEC
clients voluntarily registered with the PCAOB. Follow-up interviews with partners of these firms
indicated that the reason for voluntary registration was to signal audit quality to non-SEC
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registered clients and other stakeholders of the firm.5 This suggests a perceived benefit to
registration, even though registration with the PCAOB conveys no actual assurance of audit
quality.
[Please insert Table 1 here]
DeFond and Lennox [2011] extended Read et al.’s [2004] findings that PCAOB oversight
influenced the likelihood that small firms (audit firms that regularly audit 100 or fewer issuers
each year) would continue to audit public issuers. Specifically, DeFond and Lennox examined all
small audit firm exits (i.e., a firm that stopped auditing SEC registrants and deregistered with the
PCAOB) from 2001-2008. Their sample contained 1,233 small audit firms, of which 607 firms
(49 percent) exited the market during the analysis period. Most (394 firms, 65 percent) exited the
market shortly after the passage of SOX (i.e., 2002 to 2004). DeFond and Lennox contend that
the exodus of these firms improved audit quality for issuers, as they were more likely to avoid
AICPA peer reviews, fail to comply with PCAOB rules, and/or receive more severe peer review
or inspection reports.
2.1.1 Future Research Opportunities
Currently, both academic papers that investigated the registration process have focused
on the determinants of deregistration. We believe that there are two primary areas of future
research in the registration process. First, based on Read et al.’s [2004] finding that partners
believe voluntary registration signals audit quality to non-SEC registered clients and other
stakeholders of the firm, we believe that opportunities exist in understanding stakeholders’
perceived intrinsic value of PCAOB registration. For example, it would be beneficial to
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understand whether, for accounting firms with no issuer clients, PCAOB registration influences
external stakeholder perceptions and judgments. Additionally, there may be some interest in
exactly what type of signal PCAOB registration carries in the market. Second, we believe the
periodic and special reporting requirements (e.g., a firm or partner becoming a defendant in a
criminal proceeding) could contain valuable information. For example, is the relative frequency
of instances in which a firm, or partner at the firm, is named as a defendant in a criminal
proceeding (i.e., Form 3) associated with audit quality? Finally, as stated previously, there was a
sharp increase in firm registrations in 2009. Are there identifiable environmental or exogenous
factors that led to the increase in registrations in 2009?
We propose the following research questions:
RQ1

How does PCAOB registration affect external stakeholder perceptions?

RQ2

Do non-public audit clients interpret PCAOB registration to be a signal of higher
audit quality?

RQ3

Do audit firms that routinely submit special reports to the PCAOB (i.e., Form 3)
have higher/lower audit quality than firms that do not?

RQ4

What led to the sharp increase in PCAOB registrations in 2009?

3.0 STANDARD-SETTING
SOX, Section 103, gives the PCAOB the authority to establish and modify audit
standards for public companies, subject to SEC approval. In April 2003, the Board adopted
mainly preexisting AICPA generally accepted auditing standards as its interim standards
[PCAOB 2013c].6 The PCAOB has established 16 SEC-approved audit standards to date. Table
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These interim standards can be superseded by any subsequently established PCAOB auditing standard (e.g., AS16
superseding AU 310).
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2, Panel A, presents a list of adopted auditing standards, while Panel B presents all current
docket items related to releases and discussions on proposed standards.
[Please insert Table 2 here]
The PCAOB regularly monitors audit risks, challenges, and the prevailing economic
environment when setting and modifying its standard-setting agenda [PCAOB 2012c]. The
Board also takes into consideration (1) issues arising as a result of its oversight of registered
public accounting firms (e.g., auditor’s reporting model, fair value measurements, quality
control), (2) the continual need to improve interim audit standards adopted by the Board, and (3)
input from its Standing Advisory Group (SAG), its Investor Advisory Group (IAG), and
discussions with the SEC [PCAOB 2012c]. The Board also considers the activities of other
standard-setting bodies, both domestic and international, along with current accounting research
trends, emerging issues, and feedback solicited from the public [PCAOB 2012c]. Nevertheless,
some contend that the PCAOB’s standard-setting process may be flawed and misguided [e.g.,
Glover et al. 2009].While many studies have investigated the effects of SOX on varying facets of
the financial statement reporting process and financial statement quality (e.g. Ashbaugh-Skaife et
al. [2007], Doyle et al. [2007]), relatively few studies have focused on the effects of specific
auditing standards enacted by the PCAOB. Our focus in this section is on studies that examined
the effects of the PCAOB’s standard-setting activities (e.g., Auditing Standards Nos. 3, 7, etc.).
The reviewed literature is summarized in Table 3.
[Please insert Table 3 here]
3.1 AS2 and AS5 - Internal Controls Evaluations and Assessments
Section 404 of SOX mandated testing of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR)
by the external auditors. Post-SOX, the standards for conducting integrated ICFR ﬁnancial
8

statement audits were established initially in AS2, and later superseded by AS5.7 A robust stream
of literature has studied ICFR audits, AS2 and AS5, particularly in regards to the effects of these
two standards on audit fees, audit delays, and the disclosure (in an audit opinion) of internal
control deficiencies. These studies have largely been reviewed in one of two recent synthesis
papers – Schneider et al. [2009] or Asare et al. [2013]. In an effort to not overlap these studies,
our review focuses on papers not previously reviewed, and focuses on the key findings of papers
published subsequently.
Schneider et al. [2009] synthesized the literature as it related to characteristics of
companies reporting ICFR deficiencies, and the effects of adverse ICFR reports on financial
statement users and audit firms. Their review highlighted that increased auditor involvement in
ICFR reporting was associated with increased detection and disclosure of internal control
deficiencies (ICDs), and that the existence of a material weakness in ICFR was associated with
longer audit delay. Schneider et al.’s review also found the extant literature indicated that
auditors that issued adverse ICFR opinions were more likely to not be ratified by their clients,
and that the implementation of required ICFR reports led to significant increases in audit fees.
Asare et al. [2013] contended that the Board’s justification for issuing AS5 was to allow
auditors to exercise more judgment and to focus auditors on the most important matters of the
audit. Because Schneider et al.’s [2009] primary focus was not auditor decision making, Asare et
al. [2013] synthesized (primarily) post-SOX studies that have focused on understanding and
improving auditors’ ICFR decisions. Their review suggested that auditors have adjusted their
methodology to apply the top-down risk-based approach emphasized in AS5, with an attendant
decrease in cost to companies (compared to AS2). The authors’ review also found that auditors
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have difficulty assessing risk in complex accounting systems, might be overconfident in their
risk assessments, but that proper documentation could improve auditor judgment.
Since these two reviews, a handful of studies have furthered our understanding of AS2
and AS5. For example, Bronson et al. [2011] examined delays in audit reporting under AS2 for
26,731 firm-year observations from 2000-2005. Bronson et al. contended that the stringent
testing requirements under AS2 (not solely companies with ICFR material weaknesses as
Schneider et al. [2009] contended) resulted in auditors’ reports being released later than prior to
AS2. Further, Bronson et al. examined the severity of this “audit report lag” following AS2, and
whether this phenomenon was associated with reduced reliability in earnings announcements.
They found that audit reports were issued 10 to 15 days later on average following AS2. Further,
these delays in audit reporting appeared to be associated with more frequent revisions in earnings
estimates by audit clients, indicating that preliminary earnings information post-AS2 was less
reliable than it had been prior to the enactment of the standard.
In an effort to evaluate whether efficiencies gained by AS5 came at a cost of decreased
auditor risk assessment decision making, Mock et al. [2009], using the Dempster-Shafer theory
of belief functions, developed a risk-based evidential reasoning approach for assessing the
effectiveness of ICFR. The authors used this model to evaluate the risk assessment approach set
forth in AS5 and determined the overall effectiveness of AS5 relative to the model standard.
They found that the ICFR approach in the post-AS5 environment was quantitatively similar to
the pre-AS5 approach; however, the cost savings realized under AS5 should lead to more
efficient ICFR assessments overall.
One way in which AS5 allowed auditors to exercise judgment and increase ICFR audit
efficiency was to enable external auditor reliance on internal auditors when the internal audit
10

activities met certain criteria [PCAOB 2007]. Asare et al. [2013] suggested that while the
PCAOB has emphasized that auditors can perform an efficient, integrated audit by leveraging the
work of others, auditors must be cautious because client-provided documentation and
assessments have the propensity to bias auditor assessments. Bame-Aldred et al.’s [2013]
findings complement Asare et al.’s findings in that they proposed that the environment in which
external auditors must make a reliance decision is complex—involving several factors that must
be considered simultaneously. Moreover, the authors contend that an evolving set of auditing
standards introduces several necessary intermediary judgments that the external auditors must
process before, and during, reliance on the internal audit function.
Similarly, Smith [2012] tested investors’ perception of the tradeoff between efficiencies
gained by external auditors by relying on internal auditors and the negative effects on the
perceptions of audit quality due to the increased reliance. Based on his survey of MBA students
at a large public university, Smith examined how participants’ investment decisions varied based
on changes in the audit testing environment (representing the actual transition from AS2 to AS5).
Smith observed that participants under the AS5 condition were more likely to expect the changes
in the auditing standard to reduce audit quality. Additionally, while the intention of the standard
was to reduce overall costs, investors perceived this change as a reduction in internal controls’
effectiveness and efficiency.
Finally, Wang and Zhou [2012], using 4,132 firm-year observations from 2008 as well as
two matched control samples, examined audit fee changes following AS5. More importantly, the
authors also investigated overall audit quality (measured using abnormal accruals and meet-orbeat analysts' forecasts) pre- and post-AS5 to determine if there was any change in audit quality
following the enactment of AS5. While they found results consistent with the aforementioned
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studies (i.e. audit fees decreased noticeably between AS2 and AS5), the authors did not find any
evidence of a corresponding decrease in audit quality. The authors cited their results as evidence
that AS5 was successful in its objective of reducing ICFR testing requirements without
sacrificing overall audit quality.
3.1.1 Future Research Opportunities
Given the significance of the change from AS2 to AS5, we believe there are opportunities
for future research in this area. For example, it is possible that AS5 reversed some of the trends
observed when AS2 was originally enacted. That is, both Lennox and Pittman [2010] and
DeFond and Lennox [2011] observed auditor exits from the public audit market following the
creation of the PCAOB – often citing increased oversight and compliance effort. Following the
reduced testing requirements of AS5, have auditors who had previously exited the public audit
market re-entered?
We propose the following research question:
RQ5 Did audit firms that deregistered from SEC audits following the passage of AS2
reregister for SEC audits following the passage of AS5?
3.2 AS3 - Audit Documentation and Associated Risk Assessment
AS3 establishes general requirements for documentation that the auditor should prepare
and retain in connection with engagements conducted pursuant to the standards of the PCAOB
[PCAOB 2004]. Of note is that AS3 substantially increases auditors’ obligations to document
their risk assessments [Piercey 2011], and requires audit firms to use more detailed audit
workpapers and fewer summary memos to document their procedures [Payne and Ramsay 2008].
While not as widely examined as ICFR testing, two studies have investigated the positives and
negatives of increased audit documentation requirements.
12

Payne and Ramsay [2008] explored the overall usefulness of expanded documentation
requirements under AS3. Using an experimental setting, Payne and Ramsay [2008] examined the
frequency and duration that auditors spent examining audit evidence based on whether detailed
documentation was required, or if auditors could rely on summary memos to document their
testing. While detailed documentation was associated with more extensive reviews of audit
evidence, the use of summary memos was associated with more frequent references to the
evidence. Further, the increased duration associated with detailed documentation appeared to
lead to better error detection. However, the increased frequency associated with the use of
summary memos resulted in better memory of the evidence. These results support the importance
of the PCAOB’s focus on documentation, as well as the need for auditor self-review of prepared
documentation.
Piercey [2011] tested whether the “not documented, not done” condition placed on audit
testing following AS3 improved auditor judgments. He found that increased audit documentation
tended to be associated with more lenient auditor judgments. While the increased documentation
requirements provided more detail regarding the audit evidence, this detail tended to be
qualitative justification for the auditor’s position. Piercey [2011] contended that the PCAOB’s
documentation requirements may have had unintended effects, with adverse implications for
audit effectiveness contrary to the PCAOB’s regulatory intent.
3.2.1 Future Research Opportunities
Given the proprietary nature of audit documentation, archival investigations in this area
would be difficult to accomplish without being granted access to firms’ workpapers. That being
said, experimental investigations have the opportunity to investigate the effects of AS3 more
readily. Specifically, are increased documentation requirements associated with higher
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compliance costs (e.g., staffing decisions, budget for review time, audit pricing)? While a great
deal of the effort involved in audit documentation rests with the auditors, the acquisition of this
information may require more work on the part of the clients as well. What are the
behavioral/relational effects of increased documentation requirements from a client perspective?
Are the number of risks identified during an audit reduced in response to the enhanced
documentation of these risks (either consciously or logistically because each risk requires so
much documentation that resources are constrained)? Given the instances of documentation
deficiencies identified by the PCAOB in its inspection process, can a better methodology be
developed for auditors use when determining the sufficiency of documentation?
Finally, given the 2013 disclosure of PricewaterhouseCooper’s 2009 and 2010 quality
control issues (i.e., failure to perform sufficient procedures, or include in its work papers
sufficient evidence, to support its opinion on ICFR or its controls-reliance strategy [PCAOB
2010c]), the possibility exists that there will be an increased effort in ICFR documentation
amongst firms to avoid PCAOB-identified deficiencies. Will increased documentation and effort
requirements for reliance strategies mitigate AS5 efficiency gains?
We propose the following research questions:
RQ6

What is the relationship between increased documentation under AS3 and audit
planning decisions?

RQ7

Do clients perceive documentation requirements under AS3 differently than they did
prior to AS3?

RQ8

Does the quantification of risks under AS3 result in lower or higher quality
assessments of identified risks?

RQ9

Have evolving documentation requirements offset the efficiency gains of internal
audit function reliance under AS5?

3.3 Additional Standard-Setting Literature

14

The Board has sought to give a wide variety of stakeholders (e.g., investors, auditors,
preparers, and academics) the opportunity to provide input on standards as they are developed
[PCAOB 2013d]. This input-seeking methodology has allowed several academics the
opportunity to provide both opinions on and empirical research about proposed standards. For
example, in anticipation of AS7 concerning engagement quality reviews (EQRs) (which was
ultimately enacted by the PCAOB in 2009), Epps and Messier [2007] analyzed the written
guidance and practice aids of six international accounting firms to determine best practices for
EQRs. They noted fairly consistent responses across all firms; though there were some
noteworthy differences regarding reviewer assignment, participation, and the use of practice aids.
Epps and Messier contended that their results provided a base for the PCAOB in setting its
standard for EQRs.
Similarly, Lambert et al. [2013] explored potential, unanticipated, effects of PCAOB
Release No. 2011-007, which discusses a potential amendment to current auditing standards that
would require engagement partners to sign the audit report [PCAOB 2011d].. They found that
prospective investors were less likely to invest in a peer firm linked to a restating firm via a
shared audit partner. They contend that in an era of audit partner identity disclosure, client
performance and event history would become inextricably linked to a partner and his/her
reputation – eventually causing a shift in partner incentives and independence.
Conversely, Carcello and Li [2013] examined a sample of firms in the United Kingdom
(where engagement partner disclosure is already required) to determine the relative costs and
benefits of such a disclosure. While they found that engagement partner disclosure was
associated with increases in audit fees (presumably due to the increased exposure risk borne by
audit firms), the authors also found that engagement partner disclosure was associated with
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decreases in earnings management, increases in the issuance of qualified audit reports, and
increases in earnings informativeness.
Finally, as part of the process for obtaining feedback on proposed changes to the standard
auditor’s report (SAR), the PCAOB surveyed professional organizations and accounting
professionals regarding their opinions of PCAOB Release No. 2011-003. The PCAOB’s
proposed changes would more clearly define the purpose of the SAR; and delineate the
respective responsibilities of management and the independent auditor [PCAOB 2011c]. As a
complement to the PCAOB’s survey, Giacomino and Akers [2012] performed a survey of
accounting students (“future preparers and users of the financial statements”) regarding their
opinions on the proposed changes to the SAR. While there was some level of indifference to the
proposed PCAOB changes on the part of the students (presumably due to a lack of real-world
experience), the authors conclude that the parties surveyed all expressed similar concerns
regarding the potential for increased auditor liability, decreased client confidentiality, and the
potential impairment of independence.8
3.3.1 Future Research Opportunities
To date, researchers have investigated only a select few of the PCAOB’s 16 auditing
standards. We believe that several of the PCAOB’s recent and proposed auditing standards
present investigable topics. For example, AS8 concerns the auditor’s consideration of audit risk
in an audit; and is qualitatively similar to the risk assessment standards adopted by the
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in March of 2006. While most of the international audit
firms adopted the ASB standards, the implementation of AS8 provides an opportunity to

It should be noted that, subsequent to the publication of Giacomino and Akers’ study, the PCAOB added PCAOB
Release No. 2013-005 (an update to PCAOB Release No. 2011-003), containing proposed standards and
amendments, to its docket of current activities [PCAOB 2013b].
8
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examine how, and to what extent, the increased guidance provided by the PCAOB reduced audit
risk for local and regional audit firms that are registered with the PCAOB. Were audit failure
rates lower after the enactment of AS8? Behaviorally, or from a structured interview format,
researchers could investigate how, if at all, these auditors changed their audit risk assessment
process as a result of AS8.
We propose the following research question:
RQ10

Were audit failure rates for local and regional audits lower following the enactment
of AS8?

4.0 INSPECTIONS
SOX, Section 104, requires the PCAOB to inspect all registered public accounting firms
in connection with a firm’s performance of audits, issuance of audit reports, and related matters
involving issuers [U.S. House of Representatives 2002]. Further, if a registered firm provides
more than 100 issuer audit reports in a given year, the PCAOB must inspect it at least annually;
all other issuer auditors are subject to triennial inspections. The PCAOB inspects both U.S. and
non-U.S. registered accounting firms to assess compliance with SOX, the rules of the Board, the
rules of the SEC, and professional standards, in connection with the firm’s performance of audits
and issuance of audit reports [PCAOB 2011e].9 During inspections, the PCAOB routinely
evaluates the accounting firm's quality of work and examines its practices, policies, and
procedures [PCAOB 2011e].

For foreign-based registered firms, the PCAOB’s website [http://pcaobus.org/International/Pages/default.aspx]
states, “… non-U.S. registered firms are subject to PCAOB inspections in the same manner as U.S. firms. This often
raises special considerations. The Board … adopted a cooperative framework that allows the PCAOB to rely … on
inspection or enforcement work performed by a home-country regulator … By developing cooperative arrangements
with its counterparts, the PCAOB endeavors to minimize administrative burdens and … conflicts that non-U.S.
registered firms may face. In countries without an independent audit regulator … the PCAOB still seeks to
coordinate with the relevant financial regulator or government ministry before commencing inspections.”
9
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Figure 3 provides details on PCAOB inspections conducted since its inception.10 First,
Panel A presents the number of audit firms inspected each year by the PCAOB from 2004-2012.
Specifically, the first (second) [third] bar in each year is the number of annually (triennially)
[total] inspected audit firms for said year. Panel B shows the number of issuer audits that were
inspected from 2005-2012.11 The first (second) [third] bar in each year is the number of issuer
inspections resulting from the inspections of annually (triennially) inspected firms.
[Please insert Figure 3 here]
The selection of issuer audits for review is influenced by a number of factors, including
(1) the risk that an issuer’s financial statements could be materially misstated; (2) characteristics
of the particular issuer or its industry; (3) the audit issues likely to be encountered; (4)
considerations about the firm, a particular practice office or an individual partner; and (5) prior
inspection results [PCAOB 2012a]. DeFond [2010] contended that it is important to study the
consequences of inspections because (1) PCAOB inspections potentially impact auditors’
incentives, (2) the inspections are a central feature of the shift to quasi-governmental regulation
of the U.S. auditing profession, and (3) the shift from old AICPA peer reviews to the new
PCAOB inspections is potentially interesting because it represents a trade-off of expertise for
independence. The reviewed literature is summarized in Table 4.
[Please insert Table 4 here]
4.1 Deficiency Reporting
Anantharaman [2012] directly compared outcomes from self-regulation (i.e., peer
reviews) and statutory regulation (i.e., PCAOB inspections) for the same group of firms. She

10

All totals were taken from PCAOB Annual Reports from 2004-2012.
Inspection totals for 2004 were not provided in the 2004 PCAOB Annual Report, so our data is limited to the
period from 2005-2012.
11
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found that firms that chose their own peer reviewers tended to receive peer review opinions more
favorable than their subsequent PCAOB reports, suggesting that some firms obtained ‘friendly’
reviews. However, reviewers with industry knowledge were less likely to give favorable reviews,
and reviewers from the same geographic area were likely to give peer reviews that were more
negative than the subsequent PCAOB reports.
From a descriptive perspective, Hermanson et al. [2007] were the first to quantify
PCAOB-identified deficiencies and trends. Examining 316 small accounting firm (i.e., those
with 100 or fewer issuer clients) inspection reports through July 2006, the authors documented
that 60 percent of inspected small firms had audit deficiencies, received approximately 1.6
deficiencies per report, and had a high (70 percent) incidence of unremediated (disclosed) quality
control criticisms. The authors noted that firms with audit deficiencies were growing more
rapidly than firms without deficiencies, suggesting an over-extension into the issuer audit market
by some firms or an over-extension of firm resources.
Similarly, Church and Shefchik [2012] provided descriptive analyses of the inspection
results for large accounting firms (i.e., those with more than 100 public clients) through 2009.
They found that large firms experienced, on average, 14 auditing deficiencies per report, and that
100 percent of large firms received both audit deficiencies and quality control criticisms each
year. However, in their sample period, none of the quality control criticisms warranted public
disclosure because firms made reasonable progress in addressing the criticisms within a 12month period following the report.12 The authors noted the number, as well as the severity (e.g.,
those that result in a misstatement), of PCAOB-identified auditing deficiencies had significantly

12

Subsequent to the Church and Shefchik [2012], two large firms (Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers) had their
quality control criticisms released to the public.
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decreased over time. However, the most recent report on PCAOB inspections stated that
PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies are on the rise again [PCAOB 2012d].
Finally, Bishop et al. [2013] examined 175 first-time and 56 second-time inspection
reports for international firms through early 2012. The authors found that over half of the
inspection reports identified audit deficiencies, and two-thirds cite quality control defects.
Further, they found that (1) firms with PCAOB-identified deficiencies were smaller, but had
more issuer clients than firms without PCAOB-identified deficiencies, (2) affiliates of Big 4
firms were less likely to have audit deficiencies, and (3) whether the PCAOB acted alone or
cooperated with a local regulator had no influence on inspection results. The authors cited many
of the same issues as had been previously examined for U.S. firms (c.f., Hermanson et al.
[2007]), in that they contended most of the identified deficiencies were the result of smaller firms
over-extending into the issuer audit market. However, they noted that unlike U.S. firms, there
was no difference in the rate of audit deficiencies or quality control defects for first-time versus
second-time inspections.
4.2 Inspection Efficacy
Before reviewing literature that examines the effectiveness of the PCAOB inspection
process and its reports (presented in Table 4 Panel B), it is important to understand that the goal
of the PCAOB inspection process is to assess compliance with the standards and to improve
actual audit quality, and not necessarily to provide informative reports to make judgments about
quality [PCAOB 2012b]. Further, the PCAOB stresses that it is not the purpose of an inspection
to review all of a firm's audit work or to identify every respect in which reviewed work is
deficient, and an inspection report should not be understood to provide any assurance of the
firm's audit work [PCAOB 2011e]. Regardless of these limitations, and interpretive value of the
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reports, researchers have begun to investigate the efficacy of the inspection process on audit
quality.
Particularly, researchers have examined the effects of the inspection process in spite of
two empirical challenges. First, the reports do not identify the issuers inspected. Second, the
PCAOB uses a risk-based approach to select engagements for review; thus, the sample of issuers
and identified deficiencies are not necessarily representative of the population. Given these data
limitations, audit quality is generally not directly observable [Abbott et al. 2012], and,
accordingly, most research examines variables that indirectly infer audit quality (e.g., auditor
dismissals after an inspection report). For example, Lennox and Pittman [2010] examined 545
inspection reports issued through 2007 and tested for, but found no association between,
PCAOB-identified deficiencies and subsequent changes in clients’ audit firm choices. The
authors contended that, due to the lack of information publicly disclosed by the PCAOB
inspectors, less is known about audit firm quality under a PCAOB inspection regime than under
the AICPA peer review regime (c.f., Hilary and Lennox [2005]).
Glover et al. [2009] shared similar concerns with the efficacy of the inspection process.
In particular, the authors contended that the inspection process is flawed for several reasons. Of
primary concern is (1) that the public cannot easily distinguish between trivial and significant
inspection issues, and (2) the untimely feedback provided by the inspection process. However,
DeFond [2010] contended that simply because the inspection process fails to provide information
value does not mean it fails to improve audit quality (or at least perceived audit quality) – a
contention that has been supported by an increasing amount of research.
For example, Daugherty et al. [2011], after analyzing client retention subsequent to the
issuance of 748 inspection reports for triennially inspected firms, found that triennially inspected
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firms with PCAOB-identified deficiencies were more likely to be involuntarily dismissed by
their clients, and companies dismissing triennially inspected auditors were more likely to hire
triennially inspected firms for which the PCAOB did not identify any deficiencies. Accordingly,
they suggest that PCAOB-identified deficiencies may be costly to triennially inspected auditors.
Similarly, Landis et al. [2011] examined 339 inspection reports of triennially inspected
firms that contained audit deficiencies from 2005-2008; representing 1,015 audit deficiencies.
They classified each audit deficiency according to the area and type of audit failure. A majority
of the deficiencies were categorized into account deficiencies, which entailed inadequate
procedures associated with certain accounts. Regarding types of audit failures, nearly 90 percent
of the examined deficiencies were due to inadequate tests or documentation on the part of the
auditor. The authors also noted that the number of PCAOB-identified deficiencies was higher in
the first two years of their sample (287 and 379 deficiencies for 2005 and 2006, respectively)
than in the last two years of their sample (149 and 200 for 2007 and 2008, respectively),
suggesting that audit quality has improved as a result of the PCAOB inspection process.
In another study, Abbott et al. [2012] classified inspection deficiencies into three
categories – (1) clean, (2) GAAS-deficiencies, or (3) GAAP-deficiencies. Using a sample of all
triennially inspected, non-foreign registered firms from 2005-2007, they found that clients of
PCAOB-identified GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditors were more likely to dismiss
their auditors in favor of triennially inspected auditors that were not GAAP-deficient. In
addition, the authors found greater agency conflicts, outside blockholdings, or the presence of an
independent and expert audit committee magnified this effect. The authors found no evidence
that the clients used GAAP-deficient inspection reports to reduce audit fees in subsequent years.
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More direct measures of inspection reports’ associations with audit quality have been
examined as well. For example, Gramling et al. [2011] examined whether PCAOB-identified
audit deficiencies were associated with a change in triennially inspected audit firms’ issuance of
going concern opinions. The authors used Audit Analytics and inspection reports to associate the
frequency of going concern opinions issued from 2004-2006 for 407 triennially inspected firms
(11,879 client-year observations). They found that firms were more likely to issue going concern
opinions subsequent to receiving an inspection report containing PCAOB-identified deficiencies.
The authors suggested that this change in behavior was either (1) an increased willingness,
following a PCAOB inspection, for the audit firm to “stand up to the client” and “be tough” on
important reporting issues, and/or (2) an increased level of competence brought to the reporting
decision.
Gunny and Zhang [2012], used use three measures of audit quality (abnormal accruals,
restatements, and the propensity to issue a going concern opinion), and examined the association
between PCAOB-identified deficiencies in 527 inspection reports from 2005-2009 and audit
quality. The authors found that triennially inspected firms whose PCAOB inspection reports
contained serious deficiencies (i.e., auditor failed to prevent a GAAP departure) were associated
with lower audit quality. Specifically, the authors found clients of triennially inspected auditors
that received deficient or seriously deficient reports were associated with significantly higher
abnormal current accruals, and clients of auditors that received a seriously deficient report were
associated with a greater propensity to restate.
Similarly, Carcello et al. [2011] examined Big 4 clients’ abnormal accruals after their
audit firms’ first two inspection years (2004-2005). The authors found a significant reduction in
abnormal accruals in the year following the first PCAOB inspection, and found a further
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reduction in abnormal accruals in the year following the second PCAOB inspection; consistent
with the conclusions in Landis et al. [2011]. Finally, in a recent working paper, Lamoreaux
[2013] examined differences in audit quality for foreign registrants. Some foreign governments
prohibit PCAOB inspections of domestic audit firms despite these firms being registered with the
SEC. Lamoreaux used this condition to examine differences in audit quality for foreign firms
subject to PCAOB inspections versus those that are not. He found that audit firms in countries
subject to PCAOB inspections have a greater propensity to issue going concern opinions and
report material weaknesses in internal controls.
Researchers have also examined inspection perceptions from both auditors and investors.
Daugherty and Tervo [2010] solicited perceptions of the PCAOB inspection process from 146
partners of small (triennially inspected) firms receiving their initial inspection. They found that,
in general, smaller respondents reported initial PCAOB inspections resulted in a negative impact
on many aspects of their audit practices, while medium and larger firms reported more favorable
consequences. They noted that levels of satisfaction with nearly all aspects of PCAOB
inspections appeared to increase with firm size and the passage of time.
Similarly, Houston and Stefaniak [2013] surveyed 107 audit partners from large public
accounting firms and compared the inspection process to firms’ internal quality review (IQR)
programs. They found, relative to PCAOB inspections, IQR reviewers were perceived to have a
better understanding of firms’ audit methodologies, IQRs focused more on whether firms follow
their methodology, and IQRs examined more audit areas. In addition, the authors found partners
believed PCAOB inspectors were more focused on finding deficiencies than were IQR
reviewers, and IQR feedback was more timely and helpful for improving audit quality. Finally,
the authors found partners believed only IQRs contribute significantly to improve audit quality.
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From an investor perspective, two studies indicated that there were market repercussions
for PCAOB-identified deficiencies. First, Offermanns and Peek [2011] analyzed 358 inspection
reports issued from 2005-2010, and the 7,642 related client firm-reported observations (i.e.,
financial and market price information). They found a significant market response to the
issuances of the inspection reports, indicating that inspection reports had information content in
the marketplace. Moreover, the authors concluded that the market response could be reliably
attributed to the information in the inspection report, and that at least part of the market response
to the publication of inspection reports could be attributed to revisions in investors’ perceptions
about accounting information quality.
Second, Robertson and Houston [2010] conducted an experiment using 142 M.B.A. and
E.M.B.A. students to proxy as non-professional investors, in order to investigate investors’
perceptions of audit opinion credibility following PCAOB inspections. They found an overall
increase in perceptions of the credibility of future audit opinions, the degree to which perceptions
increased was a function of (1) deficiency severity; (2) firms responding to the reports with
concessions rather than denials; and (3) firm size.
In summary, while some research [Glover et al. 2009; Lennox and Pittman 2010;
Houston and Stefaniak 2013] questioned the efficacy of the inspection process, several studies
have contributed empirical evidence to support the position that the PCAOB inspection process
has been beneficial to the auditing profession. Specifically, the literature contends PCAOBidentified deficiencies resulted in market penalties for audit firms [Abbott et al. 2011; Daugherty
2011] and, over time, the inspection process appeared to lead to improved audit quality [Carcello
et al. 2011; Gramling et al. 2011; Gunny and Zhang 2012]. However, the degree to which this
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improvement was perceived by auditors and investors appears to differ significantly [Robertson
and Houston 2010; Offermanns and Peek 2011; Houston and Stefaniak 2013].
4.3 Future Research Opportunities
Though much progress has been made on understanding the effects of the PCAOB
inspection process, we believe there are several opportunities for future research. For example,
what are the longitudinal effects for annually inspected firms that receive improved or worsened
inspection reports than previously received? What are the repercussions for the disclosure of Part
II items (i.e., quality control deficiencies not remediated within 12 months)?
While data anonymity is often cited as a hindrance for empirical research into inspection
reports, for smaller audit firms with only a few issuer clients, issuer anonymity is diminished to
some extent (if not completely). That is, some companies audit only one (e.g., B.F. Borgers CPA
PC in 2012) or two (Farmer, Fuqua & Huff, P.C. in 2012) issuer clients. What are the effects of
this reduced anonymity? Does it put these audit firms at a disadvantage? Do clients of smaller
audit firms observe a larger contagion effect when PCAOB-identified deficiencies are released
for their auditors? For those clients that are the only issuer of an audit firm, what are the market
reactions to PCAOB-identified deficiencies in an inspection report that implicitly must come
from that issuer?
We propose the following research questions:
RQ11

Is client retention and the acquisition of new clients associated with improvements
or falloffs in PCAOB-identified deficiencies?

RQ12

Do audit firms with unremediated audit deficiencies voluntarily deregister from
SEC audits?

RQ13

Do the clients of audit firms that only have a few public clients experience more
severe market repercussions in response to deficiencies identified in the inspection
reports of these auditors?
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5.0 ENFORCEMENT
The Board uses its investigative authority to identify serious audit deficiencies that pose
risks to investors and uses its disciplinary authority to impose sanctions and penalties for those
deficiencies [PCAOB 2012a]. If the board believes one or more violations have occurred, review
of the registered public audit firm escalates from an inspection to a formal investigation. The
PCAOB has several potential sanctions, including: suspending or revoking the accounting firm's
PCAOB registration, suspending or barring wrongdoers from further association with any
registered accounting firm, limiting the accounting firm's activities, and assessing civil penalties
[PCAOB 2012a].
Similar to SEC investigations, the PCAOB maintains some discretion with regard to its
investigation findings. If necessary, however, SOX [U.S. House of Representatives 2002] allows
the board to share information with the U.S. Department of Justice, certain bank regulators, state
attorney generals, and appropriate state authorities. Once a proposed disciplinary action has been
settled, the PCAOB publicly discloses the terms of the settlement and any associated sanctions.
Figure 4 presents the number of investigations initiated from 2005-2010, as well as the number
of settled disciplinary orders from 2005-2012.13
[Please insert Figure 4 here]
Finally, the PCAOB discloses the details of disciplinary actions that are currently under
adjudication [PCAOB 2013e]. As of August 1, 2013, eleven disciplinary orders were under
adjudication.
5.1 Enforcement Research

13

Starting in 2011, the PCAOB stopped disclosing in its annual report the number of investigations it initiated
during the current year.
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To date, a modest amount of studies have examined the impact of PCAOB enforcement
actions (presented in Table 5). Gilbertson and Herron [2009] examined all PCAOB enforcement
actions through 2008. They identified 20 actions relating to 17 cases against 13 triennially
inspected accounting firms, one annually inspected accounting firm, and 23 individuals. They
examined various client and auditor characteristics involved in these cases, and found several
commonalities. First, they found that disciplined auditors frequently had longer PCAOB reviews
and more audit deficiencies identified in their inspection reports. Second, the auditors in these
cases tended to audit more SEC registrants. Finally, these audit firms were often smaller, less
financially sound, and had only a few audit partners. The authors concluded that their findings
are fairly consistent with pre-PCAOB era literature.
[Please insert Table 5 here]
Two recent studies examined the implications of PCAOB enforcement actions against
Deloitte. Dee et al. [2010] performed a study of the events surrounding the PCAOB sanctions
against Deloitte in late 2007 for its 2003 audit of Ligand Pharmaceuticals. This event marked the
first time that the PCAOB levied sanctions against a Big 4 auditor. The authors examined market
returns (measured by cumulative abnormal returns over one-, two-, and three-day windows
following the announcement of PCAOB sanctions against Deloitte) for clients of Deloitte and the
other three Big 4 public accounting firms. While the market returns for the clients of all of the
Big 4 accounting firms were negative, the returns for Deloitte clients were significantly more
negative than the rest. The authors concluded that the evidence showed that the PCAOB
sanctions revealed value-relevant information about Deloitte’s reputation or insurance value that
was not contained in the other Ligand events.
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In order to assess the effects of a Big 4 Part II disclosure, Roybark [2013] performed a
case study over the PCAOB’s 2011 disclosure of Deloitte’s unremediated quality control issues
from 2007. Roybark found that, in the 13-month period around the disclosure (April 1, 2011 to
April 30, 2012), Deloitte had a greater number of auditor changes and dismissals than other Big
4 accounting firms. Interestingly, Roybark noted Deloitte maintained its market share of audit
fees from prior years (though the total audit fees for all Big 4 firms was lower in 2011). Perhaps
most importantly, while the majority of Big 4 auditor changes and associated audit fees during
this period were retained by other Big 4 audit firms (68 percent), the remaining 32 percent of
firms that were retained by non-Big 4 firms may be cause for concern; given that smaller firms
might not be as well equipped to deal with the increased risks associated with larger clients.
In an effort to determine the reasons for PCAOB sanctions against auditor EQRs, Messier
et al. [2010] expanded upon the EQR findings of Epps and Messier [2007]. They examined 28
sanctions against EQRs from 1993 to 2008 (including two sanctions issued under the PCAOB).
Consistent with the findings in Gilbertson and Herron [2009], the authors found that most EQR
sanctions were issued to smaller firms with limited partner participation. All of the cases cited a
departure from GAAS; and 23 of the 28 cases identified a lack of due professional care on the
part of the reviewing partner (generally referring to a lack of professional skepticism). Additional
PCAOB-identified deficiencies related to the issuance of incomplete or inaccurate financial
information or a lack of conformity with GAAP.
While the extant literature on PCAOB enforcement actions has identified several
characteristics of audit firms that have been sanctioned, there has been little research regarding
the implications of sanction risk. In a recent paper, Huber [2013] posited that the risk of
sanctions by the PCAOB may be passed on to audit clients in the form of higher audit fees.

29

Huber established the legal and economic bases for PCAOB sanction risk; and called for future
research to be performed in this area.
5.2 Future Research Opportunities
Because the information available on PCAOB enforcement actions is relatively sparse,
there is a relatively small amount of research in this area. In spite of the lack of information,
however, it remains one of the more promising areas for future research opportunities. One
direction for future research is reactions to PCAOB sanctions. For example, because enforcement
actions are often associated with the audit of a particular issuer, there is a possibility that the
market could respond negatively towards that company upon announcement of the sanction.
Moreover, if a restatement is the catalyst/cause of an auditor sanction, the possibility exists the
market could double penalize an issuer (i.e., the market could penalize the issuer at the time of
the initial restatement, and then again when the auditor sanction is made public).
As Huber [2013] asserted, with the prospect of PCAOB sanctions comes an increased
risk for auditors. In addition to possible monetary penalties, there is the potential that PCAOB
sanctions could expose auditors to additional litigation risks, as confirmed by Houston and
Stefaniak [2013]. For auditors that remained in the issuer audit market following the creation of
the PCAOB, there is a question of whether these risks are considered in future audit pricing. One
issue, though, would be disentangling the effects of increased auditor effort due to the PCAOB
auditing standards and the effect of higher risk due to potential PCAOB sanctions. One
possibility would be to explore the effects of PCAOB enforcement actions on subsequent audit
fees. That is, do audit fees suffer from the negative publicity associated with PCAOB sanctions?
Finally, another potential area of consideration is the impact of different types of
enforcement actions. In addition to possible monetary penalties, the PCAOB sanctions can bar an
individual from working with a public accounting firm; and even censure or revoke the PCAOB
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registration of the accounting firm. While the effect of revocation should be relatively apparent,
other enforcement actions represent different possibilities for the future operations of sanctioned
firms. How do clients in the public audit market perceive the various sanctions, and are their
responses to these sanctions representative of these perceptions?
We propose the following research questions:
RQ14

What repercussions do clients of sanctioned auditors incur as a result of PCAOB
sanctions?

RQ15

What impact do sanctions have on audit fees in the years subsequent to a sanction?

RQ16

How do clients perceive and respond to the different types of PCAOB sanctions
against an audit firm?

6.0 CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to synthesize the body of academic research on the effects
of the PCAOB’s activities over the past decade. Specifically, we have reviewed research
pertaining to the registration of audit firms following the creation of the PCAOB, the pros and
cons of PCAOB standard-setting (and its effectiveness relative to prior standards), the actual and
perceived benefits of the PCAOB inspection process, and the characteristics of firms subject to
PCAOB enforcement actions as well as the subsequent fallout from these sanctions. Accounting
practitioners, regulators, and academics have examined these areas at length over the past
decade; our review yields several interesting results and implications for future research.
First, the prospect of more stringent oversight by the PCAOB drove many small audit
firms out of the issuer audit market [DeFond and Lennox 2011]. The very real possibility of
increased compliance and insurance costs, along with the presumption of stricter regulation,
caused many firms to abandon issuer audits altogether [Read et al. 2004]. Despite the fact that
that the PCAOB provides no representations regarding the audit quality of registered audit firms,
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the decision to stay registered by some smaller firms (and not audit issuers) is made because of
the belief that PCAOB registration signals higher audit quality [Read et al. 2004].
Second, several papers have highlighted the costs and benefits of the PCAOB standardsetting activities (e.g., Smith [2012]; Wang and Zhou [2012]). For example, while some research
supports AS3’s increased focus on documentation (e.g., Payne and Ramsay [2008]), other
research (e.g., Piercey [2011]) highlight unintended, adverse effects on auditor judgments (e.g.,
more lenient judgments).
Third, there is some contention as to whether the PCAOB inspection process yields any
improvement in audit quality [e.g., Lennox and Pittman 2010; Glover et al. 2009]. Many
accounting professionals contend that the peer-review and IQR processes provide consistently
higher quality audit reviews [Gramling et al. 2010]. Moreover, several studies asserted that the
PCAOB inspection process is more focused on identifying deficiencies in audit procedures rather
than attempting to improve overall audit quality (e.g., Houston and Stefaniak [2013]). However,
research also indicated that, despite providing less relevant detail than peer reviews, PCAOB
inspections may still improve actual audit quality due to the potential regulation, litigation, and
reputation costs associated with noncompliance [DeFond 2010]. These costs can extend to the
marketplace; where investors may penalize firms whose auditors have been singled out by the
PCAOB.
Fourth, enforcement actions and subsequent penalties borne by auditors that remained in
the issuer audit market appeared to be relatively more severe for smaller audit firms [Gilbertson
and Herron 2009]. However, enforcement actions levied against firms of all sizes resulted in
negative repercussions to both auditors (e.g., auditor retention) and to audit clients [Dee et al.
2011].
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To date, most of the PCAOB research has focused on the inspection and standard-setting
processes. While there are certainly additional areas for future research in these areas, we believe
there are significant opportunities for research in the registration and enforcement areas. That is,
because the entirety of existing registration research has focused on deregistration, there are
several possible avenues available to examine the characteristics of auditors who register with
the PCAOB (we note a, to-date unexplained, significant increase in registrations in 2009). This
area is particularly relevant following the proliferation of PCAOB audit standards in the past five
years, which (e.g., AS5) might encourage audit firms to reenter the issuer audit market.
Regarding enforcement, this area of research becomes more accessible every year as the
amount of information on enforcement actions by the PCAOB continues to increase. After 10
years, we have an ever-growing dataset of sanctions against public auditors, as well as the
underlying conditions that led to these sanctions [PCAOB 2013f].
[Please insert Table 6 here]
Our review addresses several other issues relevant to PCAOB research. Table 6 provides
a summary of potential research questions generated within this review. These questions provide
opportunities for future researchers that could improve our understanding of the interactions
between the PCAOB, public accounting firms, and their clients. The findings from this research
can have far-reaching implications for regulators and professionals, as well as academics’
perceptions and understanding of issuer auditing as a whole.
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Figure 1
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Figure 2
Audit Firm Registrations with the PCAOB by Year, 2004-2012
US, Non-US, and Total Registrants
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Figure 3
PCAOB Inspection Statistics
Annually Inspected, Triennially Inspected, and Total Firms
Panel A: Audit Firms Inspected by the PCAOB by Year, 2004-2012

Panel B: Inspections Conducted by the PCAOB by Year, 2005-2012

41

Figure 4
PCAOB Investigations Initiated and Settled by Year, 2005-2012
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Table 1
A Summary of Literature Concerning PCAOB Registration
Authors and
Date
Read et al.
[2004]

DeFond and
Lennox [2011]

Method*
A, I

A

Main
Independent
Variables
N/A

Main
Dependent
Variable
 Auditor
resignations

 Peer reviews  Auditor exits
and PCAOB
from the
inspections
public audit
market
 Auditor
exits from
 Going
the public
concern audit
audit market
opinions

Sample
 775 small auditor
resignations from 20002003
 991 firms registered with
the AICPA public
company peer review
program

 All small audit firm exits
(i.e., a firm that stopped
auditing SEC registrants
and deregistered with the
PCAOB) from 2001 to
2008










* A = Archival, C = Commentary, E = Experimental, I = Interview, R = Review, S = Survey

43

Key Findings
47 local and regional audit firms
disclosed in Form 8-Ks filed in 20022003 that they were ceasing all SEC
audits; while only eight such firms that
made this disclosure in 2000-2001.
Interviews with partners explained that
deregistering was the result of the
perception of a more stringent oversight
by the PCAOB, increased professional
liability insurance costs, and increased
scrutiny by the SEC.
Over 600 auditors with fewer than 100
SEC clients exited the market following
SOX.
The deregistration exodus of these firms
improved audit quality for issuers, as the
exiting auditors were more likely to
avoid AICPA peer reviews, fail to
comply with PCAOB rules, and/or
receive more severe peer review or
inspection reports.
Subsequent auditors were also more
likely to issue going concern opinions.

Table 2
Current and Proposed PCAOB Auditing Standards
PANEL A: Current standards adopted by the PCAOB and approved by the SEC
AS No.
Title
References in Auditors’ Reports to the Standards of the Public Company
1
Accounting Oversight Board
3
Audit Documentation
Reporting on Whether a Previously Reported Material Weakness Continues
4
to Exist
An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated
5
with An Audit of Financial Statements
6
Evaluating Consistency of Financial Statements
7
Engagement Quality Review
8
Audit Risk
9
Audit Planning
10
Supervision of the Audit Engagement
11
Consideration of Materiality in Planning and Performing an Audit
12
Identifying and Assessing Risks of Material Misstatement
13
The Auditor's Responses to the Risks of Material Misstatement
14
Evaluating Audit Results
15
Audit Evidence
16
Communications with Audit Committees
PANEL B: Docket activity relating to proposed PCAOB standards
Docket No.
Title
Proposed Auditing Standard Related to Confirmation and Related
28
Amendments to PCAOB Standards
Improving Transparency Through Disclosure of Engagement Partner and
29
Certain Other Participants in Audits
Concept Release on Possible Rulemaking Approaches to Complement
31
Application of Section 105(c)(6) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Proposed Auditing Standards on the Auditor's Report and the Auditor's
34
Responsibilities Regarding Other Information and Related Amendments
Proposed Standards for Attestation Engagements Related to Broker and
35
Dealer Compliance or Exemption Reports Required by the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission and Related Amendments to PCAOB Standards
Proposed Auditing Standard on Auditing Supplemental Information
36
Accompanying Audited Financial Statements and Related Amendments to
PCAOB Standards
37
Concept Release on Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation
Proposed Auditing Standard on Related Parties and Related Amendments to
38
PCAOB Auditing Standards
Proposed Framework for Reorganization of PCAOB Auditing Standards and
40
Related Amendments to PCAOB Auditing Standards and Rules
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Table 3
A Summary of Literature Concerning PCAOB Standard-Setting
Panel A: AS2 and AS5 - Internal Controls Evaluations and Assessments
Authors and
Date

Raghunandan
and Rama
[2006]

Method*

A

Main
Independent
Variables

Main
Dependent
Variable

Sample

 Pre- v. PostSOX period
 Material
Weaknesses in
Internal
Controls

 Audit Fees

 660 manufacturing firms
that filed SOX 404 reports
prior to May 15, 2005

 Risk
Assessment
 Efficiency
and
Effectiveness
of
Engagements

 A Big 4 Audit Firm
Approach to ICFR
assessments

Mock et al.
[2009]

T

 Auditing
Standardsetting

Schneider et al.
[2009]

R

N/A

N/A

 All SOX internal control
studies through Fall 2009
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Key Findings
 Audit fees were about 86% higher in the
post-SOX period.
 However, there was no correlation with
the presence of reported material
weaknesses and audit fees; or the
frequency of occurrence of these material
weaknesses.
 Real world internal controls over
financial reporting (ICFR) assessment
approaches were used to develop a
theoretical model
 Risk assessments based on this model
were compared to those set forth in AS5
to evaluate the overall effectiveness
relative to the standard.
 Internal control deficiencies (ICDs) were
associated with smaller and riskier
companies; and with firms that had
weaker boards, audit committees, and
financial management.
 ICDs tended to have negative reactions
in the market and subsequent auditor
judgments.

Authors and
Date

Doogar et al.
[2010]

Bronson et al.
[2011]

Krishnan et al.
[2011]

Method*

A

A

A

Main
Independent
Variables

 Changes in
Audit Fees
following AS5

 Timeliness
 Reporting
strategy
 Reliability

 Enactment of
AS5
 Client Size
 Client
Complexity

Main
Dependent
Variable
 Auditee
Fraud Risk
 Benchmark
Audit Fees
for AS2

Sample
 7,662 U.S. firm-year
observations from
November 2005 through
June 2008 with data
available in Compustat and
Audit Analytics.
 Additional criteria
restricted the final sample
to 3,023 observations.

 PCAOB
regulation
(time series –
before and
after
regulation
enactment)

 17,249 firm-year
observations from 20002005 with earnings
announcement data in
Compustat and audit report
date data in Audit
Analytics

 Audit Fees

 4,626 Compustat and Audit
Analytics firm-year
observations for firms that
adopted AS5.
 Removal of observations
with inconsistent or
inadequate information
resulted in a final sample of
3,909 observations.
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Key Findings
 Audit fees were lower overall under
AS5.
 However, this reduction appeared to be
dependent on the auditor’s assessment of
fraud risk, as clients with higher
assessed fraud risks did not experience
significant decreases in audit fees from
AS5.
 Audit report lags increased on 10 to 15
days on average following the enactment
of AS2 and AS3.
 PCAOB regulation appeared to be
associated with a change in reporting
strategy.
 Earlier announcements tended to be
more relevant, but less reliable; and
vice-versa.
 Firms that announced earlier in the postPCAOB regulation years tended to have
less reliable preliminary earnings
announcements.
 Audit fees decreased following the
enactment of PCAOB AS5; with larger
decreases for companies with material
weaknesses under AS2 receiving
subsequent “clean” opinions under AS5.
 Audit fee decreases benefitted firms on
the basis of firm size.
 Audit fee decreases appeared to be more
pronounced for more complex firms (on
the basis of number of segments and
firm mergers).

Authors and
Date

Smith [2012]

Method*

E

Wang and
Zhou [2012]

A

Bame-Aldred
et al. [2013]

R

Main
Main
Independent
Dependent
Variables
Variable
 Bottom-up
coverage based
 Perceived
standard (AS2)
Audit
vs.
Quality
Top-down risk
 Perceived
based standard
ICFR
(AS5)
Investment
 Litigation
 Investment
reform
Allocation
reducing
auditor liability

 Pre- and postAS5 period

N/A

 Audit Fees
 Audit
Quality

N/A

Sample

Key Findings

 Mock investment portfolios
of 101 MBA students

 Investors perceived reduced audit quality
following the change in standards.
 This perceived change in audit quality
was also associated with the perception
of a reduction in investment in internal
controls.

 All firms in Audit
Analytics internal control
file database as of August
 Overall audit fees decreased following
15, 2008; cross-referenced
the implementation of AS5.
with Compustat financial
 However, there was no evidence of a
variables.
corresponding decrease in audit quality
 The sample was
(using abnormal accruals and meet or
segregated into two control
beat analysts' forecasts as measures of
samples (prior to the
audit quality); indicating that AS5 was
implementation of AS5)
successful in its objective.
and a testing sample (after
the implementation of
AS5).
 The EA reliance decision is a complex
one.
 All post-SOX research on
 The high judgment environment dictates
external auditor (EA)
that reliance decisions vary from
reliance on the internal
engagement to engagement.
audit function (IAF)
 Despite the current relevance of EA
through Spring 2013
reliance on IAF, there has been little
research performed regarding how this
relationship affects audit quality.

47

Authors and
Date

Schroeder and
Hogan [2013]

Method*

A

Main
Independent
Variables
 Financial Risk
 Audit Risk
 Auditor
Business Risk
 Auditor-Client
Misalignment

Main
Dependent
Variable

 Changes to
Big 4 client
portfolios

Sample
 Auditor data from Audit
Analytics and client data
from Compustat; 20022009 (recession period is
identified as 11/15/2007
through 2009)

Key Findings
 While clients shifted between Big 4 and
non-Big 4 audit firms throughout the
sample period, the incidence of shifting
from Big to non-Big 4 was lower during
the recession/AS5 period.
 Despite taking on new high-risk clients,
Big 4 firms “balanced” their client
portfolios by leaving existing high-risk
clients; leading to lower overall audit
risk levels in the recession/AS5 period.

* A = Archival, C = Commentary, E = Experimental, I = Interview, R = Review, S = Survey
Panel B: AS3 - Audit Documentation and Associated Risk Assessment
Authors and
Date

Payne and
Ramsay [2008]

Main
Independent
Variables

Main
Dependent
Method*
Variable
 Stage 1:
Number of
times
 Stage 1:
evidence is
Documentation
examined,
Method
Amount of
time spent
 Stage 2:
examining
Number of
E, S
evidence
times evidence
is examined,
 Stage 2:
Amount of time
Number of
spent
errors
examining
identified,
evidence
Pattern
recognition,
Memory of
the evidence

Sample

Key Findings

 In the first stage, auditors reviewed
evidence items more frequently when
using summary memos, but spent more
time examining the evidence when using
detailed testing.
 286 surveys of staff- and
senior-level auditors from  In the second stage, frequency was
three of the Big 5 public
associated with better evidence memory;
accounting firms.
while duration was associated with better
error recognition.
 After removing unusable
responses from the sample,  Both frequency and duration were
the final sample size was
associated with pattern recognition,
211.
though duration was far more significant.
 The increased duration associated with
detailed workpapers appeared to also
improve pattern recognition at the
reviewer level.
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Authors and
Date

Piercey [2011]

Method*

E

Main
Independent
Variables

 Documentation
Requirements

Main
Dependent
Variable

 Audit Risk
Assessments

Sample
 Audit risk assessment task
assigned to 138 auditors
from two large public
accounting firms and 76
accounting students

Key Findings
 While increased documentation provided
more detail, this detail was generally
qualitative justification for the auditor’s
position.
 The perceived review risk was lower, but
the judgment on the part of the auditor
was not any more critical than before.
 Ironically, this resulted in more lenient
overall audit risk assessments.

* A = Archival, C = Commentary, E = Experimental, I = Interview, R = Review, S = Survey
Panel C: Additional Standard-Setting Literature
Authors and
Date

Method*

Main
Independent
Variables

Main
Dependent
Variable

Epps and
Messier [2007]

E, S

N/A

N/A

Glover et al.
[2009]

C

N/A

N/A

Sample
 Questionnaires distributed
to six international
accounting firms (Big 4
and two of the three next
largest firms)

N/A
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Key Findings
 Based on a survey of engagement quality
(EQ) reviews in the largest audit firms,
the study found some significant
differences in the areas of reviewer
assignment, participation, and the use of
practice aids.
 The authors asserted that the Board’s
ability to achieve its mission was limited
by its early choices, together with its
incentives, organizational composition,
and structure.
 They also presented high-level
recommendations for change for policy
makers, regulators, and leaders in the
profession to consider in developing
improved approaches to audit standardsetting, inspection, and enforcement.

Authors and
Date
Giacomino and
Akers [2012]

Carcello and Li
[2013]

Lambert et al.
[2013]

Method*

Main
Independent
Variables

Main
Dependent
Variable

S

N/A

N/A

A

E, S

Sample
 Surveys from 79 Business
students at a private
Midwestern university

 Engagement
partner
signatures on
audit reports

 All Datastream records for
UK companies listed on the
London Stock Exchange
from 2008-2010

 Audit quality
 Audit fees

 Audit Partner
Disclosure
 Modified Audit
Report

 Partner-Based
Information
 380 individuals with
Transfer
investment experience
(“contagion
effect”)

* A = Archival, C = Commentary, E = Experimental, I = Interview, R = Review, S = Survey
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Key Findings
 Student survey responses to proposed
changes in the standard auditor’s report
were quantitatively similar to the
responses of accounting professionals
and organizations.
 Mandatory disclosure of the engagement
partner on the audit report was
associated with higher audit fees.
 However, such disclosures were also
associated with reduced earnings
management, more qualified opinions,
and higher overall earnings
informativeness.
 Audit partner disclosure was associated
with a lower propensity to invest in firms
that shared an audit partner with a
restating firm (versus firms that only
shared a common audit firm).
 This reduced propensity to invest was
not improved by modified audit report
language indicating that audit opinions
represented the audit firm as a whole.

Table 4
A Summary of Literature Concerning PCAOB Inspections
Panel A: Deficiency Reporting
Authors and
Date

Method*

Main
Independent
Variables

Main
Dependent
Variable

Sample


Hermanson et
al. [2007]

R

N/A

 Inspection
findings

 316 PCAOB small firm
inspection reports through
2006




DeFond [2010]

C

N/A

N/A

N/A



Anantharaman
[2012]

A

 Peer reviews
and PCAOB
inspection
reports

 Review or
Inspection
outcome

 407 firms’ last peer review
and first PCAOB
inspection report
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Key Findings
The authors found that 60 percent of the
inspected firms had audit deficiencies.
Firms with audit deficiencies were
smaller, had a larger number of issuer
clients, and were growing more rapidly
than firms without deficiencies,
suggesting an over extension into the
issuer client market by some firms.
The author attempted to place the
PCAOB’s investigations into the broader
auditing and regulatory literature,
critiqued what we learn and do not learn
from their analysis, and made
suggestions for future related research.
The author found that firms that chose
their own reviewers tended to receive
peer review opinions more favorable than
their subsequent PCAOB reports.
On the other hand, reviewers with
relevant industry knowledge were less
likely to give such favorable reviews.
Further, reviewers from the same
geographic area were likely to give peer
reviews that were more negative than the
subsequent PCAOB reports.

Authors and
Date

Church and
Shefchik
[2012]

Bishop et al.
[2013]

Method*

Main
Independent
Variables

R

N/A

R

N/A

Main
Dependent
Variable

 Inspection
results

 Inspection
results

Sample

 All 2004-2009 large firm
inspection reports

 175 first-time and 56
second-time inspection
reports for international
firms issued through
February 4, 2012

* A = Archival, C = Commentary, E = Experimental, I = Interview, R = Review, S = Survey
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Key Findings
 The authors documented a significant,
downward linear trend in the number of
deficiencies from 2004 to 2009
 They also identified common, recurring
audit deficiencies, determined the
financial statement accounts most often
impacted by audit deficiencies, and
isolated the primary emphasis of the
financial statement impacted.
 The authors found that just over half of
the inspection reports identified audit
deficiencies, and two-thirds cited quality
control defects.
 Deficiency firms were smaller, but had
more issuer clients than no-deficiency
firms, reflecting possible over-extension
into the issuer audit market.
 They also found no significant
differences in the rate of audit
deficiencies or quality control defects
based on whether the PCAOB acted
alone or cooperated with a local regulator
in conducting the inspection, or based on
the home country’s legal tradition.

Panel B: Inspection Efficacy
Authors and
Date

Glover et al.
[2009]

Daugherty and
Tervo [2010]

Method*

Main
Independent
Variables

Main
Dependent
Variable

Sample

C

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

 Small firm
perceptions of
the PCAOB
inspection
process

S

 146 leaders of small
registered public
accounting firms
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Key Findings
 The authors asserted that the Board’s
ability to achieve its mission was limited
by its early choices, together with its
incentives, organizational composition,
and structure.
 They also presented high-level
recommendations for change for policy
makers, regulators, and leaders in the
profession to consider in developing
improved approaches to audit standardsetting, inspection, and enforcement.
 In general, smaller respondents reported
initial PCAOB inspections resulted in a
negative impact on many aspects of their
audit practices, while medium and larger
firms reported more favorable
consequences.
 Collectively, responding firms evaluated
their initial inspection team’s
performance favorably, but were more
critical of other aspects of the inspection
process.
 Levels of satisfaction with nearly all
aspects of PCAOB inspections appeared
to increase with firm size and the passage
of time.

Authors and
Date

Lennox and
Pittman [2010]

Carcello et al.
[2011]

Daugherty et
al. [2011]

Main
Independent
Variables

Main
Dependent
Variable

A

 Prior peer
review report
opinion
 PCAOB
inspections
 Change in
number of
audit clients

 PCAOB
inspections
 Audit firm
exits from
the public
market
 Audit
deficiencies
identified in
PCAOB
inspection
reports

Sample
 [Parts 1 and 2] 545
PCAOB inspection reports
through December 31,
2007; 1001 peer review
reports between 1997 and
2003
 [Part 3] 545 PCAOB
inspection reports through
December 31, 2007;
Auditor change data in
Auditor-Trak and Audit
Analytics from 2007 to
2008

A

 Years
subsequent to
the first two
PCAOB
inspections

 Changes in
audit quality
(abnormal
accruals)

 Changes in abnormal
accruals between 2004 and
2006 for 4,719 Big 4
auditee-years

A

 Deficiency
type and
quality
control issues

 Voluntary
and
involuntary
client loss

 748 inspections performed
on triennially inspected
auditors for reports
released from 2005-2008

Method*
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Key Findings
 PCAOB inspections have not been
perceived as influencing audit quality or
client retention.
 However, the new inspections standards
have caused a number of smaller audit
firms to exit the public audit market.
 Taken as a whole, it was inconclusive
whether the PCAOB had an effect on
audit quality.
 The authors found a significant reduction
in abnormal accruals in the year
following the first PCAOB inspection
 They found a further reduction in
abnormal accruals in the year following
the second PCAOB inspection.
 The authors found deficiency reports
were associated with triennially
inspected auditors being involuntarily
dismissed by their clients, and companies
that dismissed triennially inspected
auditors were more likely to hire
triennially inspected auditors without
deficiency reports.
 Also, deficiency reports were associated
with triennially inspected auditors
voluntarily resigning from their publicly
traded clients, and ceasing to be
registered with the PCAOB.

Authors and
Date

Gramling et al.
[2011]

Landis et al.
[2011]

Offermanns
and Peek
[2011]

Abbott et al.
[2012]

Method*

A

A

Main
Independent
Variables
 Inspection
deficiencies

N/A

A

 Inspection
deficiencies

A

 Clean,
GAASDeficient, or
GAAPDeficient
PCAOB
inspection
reports for
triennially
inspected
firms

Main
Dependent
Variable

Sample

 Change in
going
concern
reporting
decisions

 407 triennially inspected
firms (11,879 client-year
observations) from 20042006

 Inspection
deficiencies
by area
 Inspection
deficiencies
by failure
type

 339 inspection reports of
triennially inspected firms
from 2005 to 2008 that
contained audit
deficiencies

 Audit quality

 224 first-round and 134
second-round inspection
reports between January
2005 and March 2010

 Auditor
dismissals

 521 triennially inspected
nonforeign accounting
firm PCAOB inspection
reports filed from Jan. 21,
2005 to Dec. 31, 2007, of
which 256 (49.1%) were
clean, and 61 (11.7%)
were GAAP-deficient
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Key Findings
 The authors’ analysis generally indicated
that firms with PCAOB deficiencies were
more likely to issue a GC opinion for
financially distressed clients subsequent
to their PCAOB inspection than prior to
their inspection.
 A majority of the deficiencies by area
were identified as inadequate procedures
associated with certain accounts.
 Nearly 90 percent of the examined
deficiencies by failure type were due to
inadequate tests or documentation on the
part of the auditor.
 The authors found a statistically and
economically significant market response
to the issuances inspection reports.
 The authors also found that at least part
of the market response to the publication
of PCAOB inspection reports can be
attributed to revisions in investors’
beliefs about accounting information
quality.
 Results suggested that the clients of
GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected
auditors were more likely to dismiss
these auditors in favor of triennially
inspected auditors that were not GAAPdeficient.
 The authors also found that greater
agency conflicts, the presence of an
independent and expert audit committee,
and outside blockholdings magnified the
effect.

Authors and
Date

Gunny and
Zhang [2012]

Houston and
Stefaniak
[2013]

Method*

A

S

Main
Independent
Variables

 Inspection
deficiencies

N/A

Main
Dependent
Variable

Sample

 Audit quality
(abnormal
accruals,
restatements,
and the
propensity to
issue a going
concern
opinion)

 527 triennially inspected
firm inspection reports
from 2005-2009

 Large firm
partner
perceptions
of PCAOB
inspection
and Internal
Quality
Review
(IQR)
processes

 107 audit partners from
large public accounting
firms
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Key Findings
 The authors found that PCAOB
inspections were associated with lower
audit quality when the reports were
seriously deficient.
 More specifically, they found clients of
triennially inspected auditors that receive
a deficient or seriously deficient report
were associated with significantly higher
abnormal current accruals and clients of
auditors that received a seriously
deficient report were associated with a
greater propensity to restate.
 A majority of partners predicted the year
of both reviews and perceived that,
relative to PCAOB inspections, IQR
reviewers had a better understanding of
firms’ audit methodologies, IQRs
focused more on whether firms followed
their methodology, and IQRs examined
more audit areas.
 In addition, partners believed that
PCAOB inspectors were more focused
on finding deficiencies than were IQR
reviewers, and that IQR feedback was
more timely and helpful for improving
audit quality.
 Both reviews were perceived to impact
professional reputation; however,
partners perceived that PCAOB
inspections increased their firms’
litigation risk more so than did IQRs.

Authors and
Date

Lamoreaux
[2013]

Robertson and
Houston
[2010]

Method*

A

E

Main
Independent
Variables
 PCAOB
inspection
exposure

 Deficiency
severity and
firm response

Main
Dependent
Variable
 Going
concern
opinions
 Reports of
material
weaknesses

 Investor
perception of
future audit
credibility

Sample

Key Findings

 4,670 firm-year
observations from 20012010 of foreign firms
listed in the United States

 Audit firms in jurisdictions that are
subject to the PCAOB inspection process
tended to issue more going concern
opinions and report more material
weaknesses in internal controls.

 142 M.B.A. and E.M.B.A.
students to proxy as nonprofessional investors

 While the authors found an overall
increase in perceptions of the credibility
of future audit opinions, the degree to
which perceptions increase was a
function of three salient characteristics of
PCAOB reports: (1) inspections
contained high (low) severity
deficiencies; (2) firms responded to the
reports with concessions (denials); and
(3) for small (large) firms.

* A = Archival, C = Commentary, E = Experimental, I = Interview, R = Review, S = Survey

57

Table 5
A Summary of Literature Concerning PCAOB Enforcement Actions
Authors and
Date

Gilbertson and
Herron [2009]

Dee et al.
[2011]

Messier et al.
[2010]

Method*

Main
Independent
Variables

Main
Dependent
Variable

R

N/A

N/A

 17 PCAOB enforcement
actions issued through 2008

Key Findings
 Firms that were disciplined by the
PCAOB had longer reviews and more
identified deficiencies.
 These firms tended to be smaller and less
financially sound audit firms with fewer
partners.

 Cumulative
abnormal
returns

 Big 4 auditor clients as of
the event date (December
10, 2007 - the
announcement of PCAOB
sanctions against Deloitte)
in Audit Analytics

 All Big 4 clients experienced negative
returns during the event window, but that
the returns for Deloitte clients were
significantly more negative.

A

A

 Deloitte
client vs.
non-Deloitte
client

 GAAS/
 Engagement
GAAP
Quality
Violations
Reviewer
identified by
(EQR)
the SEC/
Sanctions
PCAOB

Sample

 28 cases of sanctions
against EQRs between
1993 and 2008
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 Less than 30% of the sanctions in the
sample were levied against Big 4/Big 5
accounting firms.
 Most of the identified deficiencies related
to a lack of due professional care on the
part of the reviewer; by and large
referring to a lack of professional
skepticism.
 Additional deficiencies identified related
to the issuance of incomplete or
inaccurate financial information or a lack
of conformity with GAAP.

Huber [2013]

Roybark
[2013]

C

A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

 The disclosure of the
nonpublic sections of the
PCAOB’s 2007 inspection
of Deloitte

 The risk of sanctions by the PCAOB may
be passed on to audit clients in the form
of higher audit fees.
 More research needs to be done on this
subject.
 Deloitte experienced a greater number of
auditor changes and dismissals in the 13month period surrounding the disclosure.
 The auditor switches from Big 4 to nonBig 4 firms during this period may be
cause for concern, as the smaller auditors
may not be capable of handling the
heightened risks associated with handling
larger clients.

* A = Archival, C = Commentary, E = Experimental, I = Interview, R = Review, S = Survey
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Table 6
Summary of Future Research Questions
Registration
RQ1: How does PCAOB registration affect external stakeholder perceptions?
RQ2: Do non-public audit clients interpret PCAOB registration to be a signal of higher audit
quality?
RQ3: Do audit firms that routinely submit special reports to the PCAOB (i.e., Form 3) have
higher/lower audit quality than firms that do not?
RQ4: What led to the sharp increase in PCAOB registrations in 2009?
Standard-Setting
AS2 and AS5 - Internal Controls Evaluations and Assessments
RQ5: Did audit firms that deregistered from SEC audits following the passage of AS2
reregister for SEC audits following the passage of AS5?
AS3 - Audit Documentation and Associated Risk Assessment
RQ6: What is the relationship between increased documentation under AS3 and audit
planning decisions?
RQ7: Do clients perceive documentation requirements under AS3 differently than they did
prior to AS3?
RQ8: Does the quantification of risks under AS3 result in lower or higher quality assessments
of identified risks?
RQ9: Have evolving documentation requirements offset the efficiency gains of internal audit
function reliance under AS5?
Additional Standard-Setting Literature
RQ10: Were audit failure rates for local and regional audits lower following the enactment of
AS8?
Inspections
RQ11: Is client retention and the acquisition of new clients associated with improvements or
falloffs in PCAOB-identified deficiencies?
RQ12: Do audit firms with unremediated audit deficiencies voluntarily deregister from SEC
audits?
RQ13: Do the clients of audit firms that only have a few public clients experience more severe
market repercussions in response to deficiencies identified in the inspection reports of
these auditors?
Enforcement
RQ14: What repercussions do clients of sanctioned auditors incur as a result of PCAOB
sanctions?
RQ15: What impact do sanctions have on audit fees in the years subsequent to a sanction?
RQ16: How do clients perceive and respond to the different types of PCAOB sanctions
against an audit firm?
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